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Abstract
This paper quantifies the deterioration of achievable stabilization outcomes when 
monetary policy operates under imperfect credibility and weak anchoring of long-term 
expectations. Within a medium-scale DSGE model, we introduce through a simple signal 
extraction problem, an imperfect knowledge configuration where price and wage setters 
wrongly doubt about the determination of the central bank to leave unchanged its long-
term inflation objective in the face of inflationary shocks. The magnitude of private 
sector learning has been calibrated to match the volatility of US inflation expectations at 
long horizons. Given such illustrative calibrations, we find that the costs of maintaining a 
given inflation volatility under weak credibility could amount to 0.25 pp of output gap 
standard deviation. 
Keywords: Monetary policy; Imperfect credibility; Signal extraction. 
JEL Classification: E4, E5, F4. 5
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Non-Technical Summary
An abundant strand of literature has studied monetary policy stabilization under rational ex-
pectations and perfect central bank credibility. In this context, a monetary authority committed
to deliver price stability can successfully steer expectations in the face of inﬂationary distur-
bances and achieve appropriate inﬂation volatility at reasonable output costs. However, a less
extremedescriptionofthemacroeconomiclandscapewouldhavetoaccountforimperfectcred-
ibility of the central bank: credibility is an asset which is built and preserved over time, and
could for example be undermined by an adverse sequence of inﬂationary shocks which, taken
individually, would not have required speciﬁc policy actions.
In this note, we intend to illustrate such a conﬁguration within a medium-scale DSGE model
for the US economy where price and wage setters question the determination of the monetary
authority to deliver price stability in the face of cost-push shocks. More speciﬁcally, we specify
an ad hoc ﬁltering problem where price and wage setters do not observe the central bank’s in-
ﬂation target and the ”true” inﬂationary shock separately.
This phenomenonwould strongly amplify the transmission of theprice shock,notably through
stronger wage claims: monetary policy will face a higher sacriﬁce ratio in its attempt to bring
down inﬂation volatility. The deterioration of achievable stabilization outcomes due to our
imperfect credibility speciﬁcation has some resemblance with the implications of backward
indexation in price and wage settings.6
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tion, has studied monetary policy stabilization under rational expectations and perfect central
bank credibility. In this context, a monetary authority committed to deliver a given inﬂation
rate over the medium term can successfully steer expectations in the face of inﬂationary dis-
turbances and achieve appropriate inﬂation volatility at reasonable output costs. However, a
less extreme description of the macroeconomic landscape would have to account for imperfect
credibility of the central bank: credibility is an asset which is built and preserved over time,
and could for example be undermined by an adverse sequence of inﬂationary shocks which,
taken individually, would not have required speciﬁc policy actions. In this note, we intend to
quantify the deterioration of achievable stabilization outcomes for monetary policy under im-
perfect credibility. To this aim, we use a medium-scale DSGE model, where ﬁrms and unions
set price and wages according to their imperfect perception about the central bank’s inﬂation
target in the face of cost-push shocks.
2 Analytical framework
We make use of the medium-scale DSGE model presented in Smets and Wouters (2007) and
rationalize some misperceptions by private agents on the inﬂation objective of the monetary
authority through a stylized signal extraction problem when cost-push shocks hit the economy.
We do not spell out here all the log-linearized equations of the model and refer to the previous
paper for a full description of these relations.
2.1 Model
The core hypothesis of our analysis is that price and wage setters wrongly perceive a time
varying inﬂation target, denoted ¯ πt. Here we thus present all the Smets and Wouters equations
that are modiﬁed by this assumption. The linearized version of the price setting behavior is
given by:













The real wage dynamics is governed by:
wt = w1wt−1 +( 1− w1)(Etwt+1 + Etπt+1) − w2πt + w3πt−1 − w4μw
t + εw
t (2)




1+βγ(1−σc) , w3 = ιw
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The notations are similar to equations (10) and (13) of Smets and Wouters (2007).
The monetary authority behavior is strictly similar to Smets and Wouters. It is assumed to
operate according to an interest rate feedback rule speciﬁcation reﬂecting our assumption that
the central bank has a ﬁxed inﬂation objective over the long-term, corresponding to the steady
state inﬂation rate. For the sake of clarity, we recall that the rule has, in deviation from the
steady state, the following form:






wherea small case variable denoteslog-deviation of that variable from its deterministic steady-
state level. It incorporates terms on lagged inﬂation, lagged output gap and its ﬁrst difference.
The output gap is deﬁned as the log-difference between actual and ﬂexible-price output.
2.2 Private sector learning
We assume that private agents do not have a perfect knowledge of central bank’s inﬂation tar-
get: they doubt about the commitment of the monetary authority to maintain a ﬁxed inﬂation
target in the face of cost-push shocks.
More speciﬁcally, we specify an ad hoc ﬁltering problem where price and wage setters do not
observe ¯ πt and ε
p
t separately. Instead, we approximate an imperfect knowledge conﬁguration
where price and wage setters only receive a signal on the aggregate markup in the goods the
market, deﬁned as επ
t = ε
p
t +( 1− π1 − π2ρπ)¯ πt.
They face a signal extraction problem that therefore entails backing out the two components.
Given their supposedknowledgeof the driving process of the shocks and their perceived stan-
dard deviation of the inﬂation target, they form an estimate of the current inﬂation target shift






































where ρp, ρπ ∈ [0,1] and η
p
t, ηπ
t are iid. exogenous shocks. Example of such kind of imperfect
information mechanism can be found, although for a different setof shocks, in Erceg and Levin
(2003). Noteherethat wespeciﬁedthestochasticprocessfor thecost-pushshockas AR(1) while
Smets and Wouters (2007) used an ARMA(1,1). This simpliﬁes the ﬁltering problem and allows
more direct comparison with the imperfect credibility speciﬁcation of Erceg and Levin (2003)8
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in particular.
Applying the Kalman ﬁlter to the state-space system described above, one obtains the optimal
estimates of the two unobserved components of επ
t . These estimates of the current inﬂation











































Finally, the optimal forecasts of the expected future inﬂation target and cost push shocks are



















All the parameter values, if not discussed later, are ﬁxed to the mode of the posterior distribu-
tion of the long sample estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007). The persistence parameter of
the AR(1) process for the markup shock ε
p
t, and the standard deviation of the structural shock,
have been estimated, assuming that all other parameters of model were ﬁxed at their value in
Smets and Wouters. In particular, the autoregressive parameter, ρp, is estimated at 0.25.
We set to zero the backward indexation parameters for price and wage settings, ιp and ιw. Sev-
eral papers have highlighted the fact that those modeling features suffer from weak structural
foundations. Benati (2008) shows notably that statistical inference on intrinsic inﬂation persis-
tenceembeddedin traditional hybrid NewKeynesianPhillips curves dependsonthemonetary
regime in place. Monetary policy conduct which fails to provide a credible nominal anchor or a
credible commitment to low and stable inﬂation may increase the backward-looking features of
inﬂation dynamics. Against this background, we preferred to pursue the imperfect credibility
exercise at the core of this note in purely forward-looking price and wage settings. Thereafter,
we will nonetheless compare the monetary policy implications of our learning speciﬁcation to
the ones of higher backward indexation, interpreted as weak central credibility.9
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The learning features will be designedto increase the volatility of 5-year forward 5 years ahead
inﬂation expectations towards levels consistent with available evidence. Among the indi-
cators of inﬂation expectations, the break-even inﬂation rates (BEIRs) derived from nominal
and inﬂation-indexed bond yield constitute an important market-based measure. Notably, the
BEIRswhich measure inﬂation compensation for the 5-year period starting in 5 years time over
a ﬁve-year horizon, is used by many central banks as a preferred measure of private sectorfore-
cast for the medium-term inﬂation rate. Concerning the US, some studies have documented
the excess sensitivity of long-term forward break-even inﬂation rates to macro-economic news
(see for example Beechey, Johannsen and Levin (2008)). This phenomenon may partly reﬂect
the weak anchoring of long term expectations when economic agents do not have a perfect
knowledge of the central bank inﬂation objective. To give an order of magnitude, the standard
deviation of the 5-year forward BEIR 5 years ahead (seasonally adjusted) from January 2005 to
January 2008 amounts to 0.16 pp of annual inﬂation1.
By contrast, the medium-scale DSGE estimated on US data of Smets and Wouters (2007) which
features rational expectations as well as a constant inﬂation objective for the central bank,
would point to a much lower unconditional volatility of average expected inﬂation at such
distant horizons. This results hold when setting backward indexation parameters to zero or re-
placing the ARMA(1,1) process for the cost-push shock by an AR(1). By comparing the BEIRs
to the conditional inﬂation forecasts of the DSGE, we interpret those market-based indicators
of inﬂation expectations as the best predictors of inﬂation outcomes at a given horizon. Be-
yond the obvious caveat related to time-varying risk premia embedded in asset prices, it is
important to notice that in our calibration exercise, the BEIRs do not represent the perceptions
of a particular set of agents about future inﬂation developments, and a fortiori about central
bank’s objective, but instead they map the most likely course of inﬂation rates resulting from
the general equilibrium allocation. A clear distinction should therefore be drawn between the
inﬂation forecast of the DSGE model (which could be compared to the BEIRs indicators) and
the uncertainty of price and wage setters about the medium-term inﬂation target of the mon-
etary authority (which is only one element of the macroeconomic determination of inﬂation
dynamics).
Consequently, when calibrating our imperfect knowledge speciﬁcation, we chose a stochastic
processfor theperceived inﬂation objective of price and wage settersso that thevolatility of the
inﬂation forecasts generated by the model comes close the observed variance of BEIRs. More
precisely, we set the autoregressive coefﬁcient on the perceived inﬂation target, ρπ, to 0.99, as
1Of course, the BEIRs are not unbiased measures of inﬂation expectations since they incorporate a time-varying
risk premia. But, available measures trying to correct for such risk compensations still tend to indicate that market-
based inﬂation expectations for the US economy would feature excessive ﬂuctuations. Thereafter, we examine the
implications for monetary policy should expectation instability be due to imperfect credibility.10
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in Erceg and Levin (2003). Then, we choose the variance of the innovation, ηπ
t , in order to
achieve a standard deviation of average inﬂation expectations over a 5-year period, in 5 years
time, which corresponds to the standard deviation of the 5-year forward BEIR 5 years ahead
(seasonally adjusted) from January 2005 to January 2008.
Figure 1: Private sector perceptions.



























Figure 1 presents the private sector perception of the price markup disturbance and the in-
ﬂation target compared with true developments. While the markup shock is well perceived
by agents, the degree of misinterpretation about the central bank objective is sizeable in this
calibration. Under rational expectations, a high volatility in the inﬂation target is needed to
generate sufﬁcient ﬂuctuations in inﬂation expectations at long horizons. Overall, a markup
shock which implies ex ante an inﬂationary impulse of 0.2 pp leads to initial shift on the per-
ceived inﬂation target of the same magnitude. The imperfect credibility mechanism introduced
in this note could seem rather extreme but remains illustrative of the degree of misperception
required to account for higher volatility in long-term inﬂation forecasts. Actually, taking as
example the case of oil price shocks, the learning mechanism calibrated in this paper would as-
sume that price and wage setters extrapolate the direct effect of oil prices on headline inﬂation,
into an upward shift of the central bank’s inﬂation objective of a similar magnitude. While ex-
treme, this calibration may portray a plausible situation when long-term inﬂation expectations
become weakly anchored in a context of repeated and one-sided price shocks.11
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3 Monetary policy under imperfect credibility
The calibration of the imperfect credibility mechanism has been obtained using the estimated
interest rate rule as the best empirical description of historical monetary policy conduct. How-
ever, in order to assess the policy implications of expectation instability, we will rely on a more
precise description of central bank’s decision problem.
We consider a class of monetary policy conducts which aim at minimizing an intertemporal
loss function, given the structural equilibrium conditions describing the economy. The loss
function considered can be written as follows:
Lt = λππ2





where λπ, λy and λr are the coefﬁcients weighting the respective costs of inﬂation volatility,
ﬂuctuations in the model-based output gap and in the nominal interest rate. We set λy = λr =
0.15 such that, for λπ =1and under perfect credibility, the model closely replicates the second
order moments of the reference model where monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. We then
vary the weight on inﬂation from 0 to 100. For any loss function, we derive the stochastic allo-
cation and compare the standard deviations of inﬂation and output gap.
Figure 2 presents efﬁciency frontiers along the inﬂation/output gap tradeoff under three con-
ﬁgurations: full information, imperfect credibility, and backward indexation in price and wage
settings. We see that the imperfect credibility speciﬁcation induces a shift in the efﬁciency
frontier to the North East of the diagram. Our description of private agents’ doubts on cen-
tral bank inﬂation objective has made it exogenous to monetary policy conduct over the cycle:
this intends to illustrate the fact that once the credibility of the monetary authority weakens,
monetary policy has to operate in a less favorable environment where achievable stabilization
outcomes inevitably deteriorate. Consider ﬁrst the loss function which delivers in the full in-
formation case, the same inﬂation volatility as under the estimated rule. This loss function has
a weight on inﬂation, λπ, of approximately 1 (point A in Figure 2). It turns out that the imper-
fect credibility would worsen the stabilization tradeoff, increasing the standard deviations of
quarterly inﬂation and output gap, by 0.05 pp and almost 0.2 pp respectively (shift from A to
B in Figure 2). Should monetary policy attempt to restore the level of inﬂation variance close
to the full information case, monetary policy would need to be less tolerant for the inﬂationary
effects of cost-push shocks, increasing λπ to more than 2 (shift from B to C in Figure 2). Then
the output gap costs of inﬂation stabilization reach more than 0.25 pp of standard deviation.
For the sake of comparison, we derived the efﬁciency frontier under full information and back-
ward indexation parameters set at ιp = ιw =0 .4. We chose illustrative values which are close12
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Efficiency frontier: full information
Efficiency frontier: imperfect cerdibility
Efficiency frontier: indexation parameters at 0.4
A: Loss 1, full information
B: Loss 1, imperfect credibility
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to Smets and Wouters estimates. With higher indexation, the macroeconomic stabilization de-
teriorates as the efﬁciency frontier shifts to the right of Figure 2, towards higher output gap
volatility for given inﬂation variance. Interestingly, the efﬁciency frontier under higher index-
ation is very close to the one obtained under imperfect credibility. However, similar volatility
conﬁgurations are implemented through a lower relative aversion for inﬂation variance in the
higher indexation case. This is attested by the proximity of points D and C in Figure 2.
The comparison of the efﬁciency frontiers is illustrative of overall stabilization costs stemming
from imperfect credibility, but unconditional moments may mask more pronounced modiﬁca-
tions in the propagation mechanism.
We plot in Figure 3 impulse response functions to a cost-push shock for the 4 conﬁgurations
highlighted in Figure 2 by the points A, B, C, D. As regards the macroeconomic transmission
underimperfect credibility compared with the full information case, the shift in private percep-
tions about the long term inﬂation objective of the central bank leads to a stronger and more
persistent reaction of wages which perpetuate the inﬂationary shocks. Inﬂation remains above
baseline for a protracted period of time while, under full information, monetary policy aimed
at compensating somewhat the initial inﬂation slippage over the medium term. The contrac-
tion in output is also more pronounced and persistent, with the peak effect being almost three
times larger. In resisting intensiﬁed underlying inﬂationary pressures, the monetary authority
increases slightly the nominal interest rate, contrary to the marginal interest rate cuts imple-
mented in the full information case.
Given our imperfect credibility speciﬁcation and the rational expectations hypothesis,the com-
mitment of the central bank to amend its ”rule-like” behaviour in a certain way may have pow-
erful implications on economic propagation through expectation channels. By increasing the
policy aversion for inﬂation volatility, the central bank can indeed mute the price pressures
generated by shifts in private perceptions and bring the inﬂation response much closer to the
full information case (see Loss 2 in Figure 3). Compared with the benchmark transmission
under imperfect credibility, the commitment to a stronger anti-inﬂationary policy conduct af-
fects expectations of price and wage setters in a self-equilibrating manner, thereby leading to
a weaker increase in wage claims and more subdued cost pressures for ﬁrms. The weaker in-
ﬂation response is also achieved through a more pronounced contraction of output. Ex post,
given the effective steering of expectations and the moderate inﬂation dynamics, interest rates
are lower than in the benchmark imperfect credibility case.
Like imperfect credibility, backward indexation ampliﬁes the response of wages and inﬂation,
has a contractionary effect and leads to higher interest rates. However, the dynamic properties14
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Figure 3: Comparison Impulse response functions. Standard deviations of quarterly variables, in
%.
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of the macroeconomic propagation are sensibly different. Through backward indexation, the
inﬂationary shock mechanically triggers a surge in wage claims in the ﬁrst quarters, beyond
the magnitude of increases recorded in the imperfect credibility case, but the rise in compensa-
tion turns out to be short-lived. Price and wage inﬂation rates revert to below-baseline levels
after approximately 5 quarters. The persistence of the inﬂationary shock on nominal variables
is therefore much more limited in the backward indexation case. The widening of the output
gap is similar to the one observed under imperfect credibility over the ﬁrst 5 quarters but after-
wards the reversion towards baseline is much faster. The nominal interest rate ends up below
baseline after only few quarters. Overall, the IRFs highlight differences between backward
indexation and our imperfect credibility speciﬁcation that were masked by moments’ compar-
ison. Backward indexation leads to stronger price and wage response in the short-term but the
persistence of the macroeconomic propagation is signiﬁcantly weaker than under imperfect
credibility.
4C o n c l u s i o n
History shows that private agents’ perceptions about the objectives of the central bank can
temporarily deviate from the central bank’s own views and communication even in monetary
regimes that have a solid institutional and social legitimacy. Inﬂationary shocks can occasion-
ally get entrenched in price and wage settings if circumstances are particularly unfavourable
and deviations from price stability prolonged in time.
If a central bank is weakly credible in delivering price stability, private agents may interpret
cost-push shocks as a temporary change in the ”comfort zone” in which the central bank could
toleratemedium-terminﬂation dynamics. Thisphenomenonwouldstronglyamplify thetrans-
mission of the price shock notably through stronger wage claims: monetary policy will face a
higher sacriﬁce ratio in its attempt to bring down inﬂation volatility. We rationalized here such
deterioration in achievable stabilization outcomes by a simple ﬁltering problem where agents
infer from aggregate markup dynamics a perception of the central bank’s medium term objec-
tive and of the true cost-push shock.
Under more realistic descriptions of the functioning of the economy, the status of backward
indexation in wage and price setting as ”deep structural features” becomes relatively fragile:
indexation may plausibly reﬂect the weak credibility of the monetary authority or the adaptive
nature of private agents’ learning process. Here, we illustrated some similarities in terms of
achievable stabilization outcomes between our imperfect credibility speciﬁcation and the pres-
ence of backward indexation.16
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